We applied bit-flipping and random fault attacks to TinyJAMBUv2. These attacks are investigated using three precision controls: precise, moderate and no control. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first application of these fault models to TinyJAMBU. Our research indicates that the bit-flipping fault attacks using precise control and moderate control require an average of 128 faults and 456 faults, respectively. For the random fault attacks using the precise control and moderate control model, an average of 256 faults and 850 faults are required, respectively. These bit-flipping and random fault attacks can recover 58 internal state bits and 15 key bits of the cipher. For the no-control model, we conducted a preliminary investigation that shows one cannot conclusively determine which target register is injected with the fault. All the attacks are experimentally verified. Based on our analyses, TinyJAMBU has a large security margin against the selected approaches of the differential fault attack.